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In free-space quantum key distribution (QKD), the sensitivity of the receiver’s detector channels
may depend differently on the spatial mode of incoming photons. Consequently, an attacker can
control the spatial mode to break security. We experimentally investigate a standard polarization
QKD receiver, and identify sources of efficiency mismatch in its optical scheme. We model a practical
intercept-and-resend attack and show that it would break security in most situations. We show
experimentally that adding an appropriately chosen spatial filter at the receiver’s entrance may be
an effective countermeasure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2], in theory, al-
lows two distant parties Alice and Bob to establish a
shared secret key with unconditional security [3–7]. Al-
though a number of successful implementations of QKD
have been reported [8–11] and commercialization is un-
derway [12], the technology is yet to achieve widespread
use. One important reason is that the maximum distance
is still of the order of 300 km [13] in fiber-based sys-
tems. Consequently, implementation of free-space QKD
utilizing ground-to-satellite links [14–22] that promises
long-distance quantum communication is now a very at-
tractive field of research.
Implementation imperfections have enabled a number
of successful attacks on QKD [23–31]. The main reason
behind this is the deviation of the actual behaviour of
the devices from the ideal expected behaviour. Thus,
to guarantee the security, it is of utmost importance
to scrutinize the practical device behaviours for possible
deviations. One such source of deviation in free-space
QKD can be the assumed symmetry of detection effi-
ciency among all received quantum states in Bob’s de-
tector [28–30, 32, 33]. If a deviation from this assump-
tion exists, an adversary Eve can send light to Bob in
different spatial modes so that one of his detectors has
a relatively higher probability of click than the other de-
tector(s) [34]. In this way, she can exploit the mismatch
in efficiency and make Bob’s measurement outcome de-
pendent on his measurement basis and correlated to Eve,
which breaks the assumptions of typical security proofs.
In this work, we investigate how crucial this can be to the
security of QKD. (While finishing this paper, we became
aware of a recent similar work [35].)
We study a receiver designed for polarization encod-
ing free-space QKD, described in Sec. II. We test it in
∗ ssajeed@uwaterloo.ca
Sec. III by sending an attenuated laser beam to the re-
ceiver with various angle offsets and recording the relative
detection probability in each channel, to find incidence
angles with high efficiency mismatch. With these data,
we show in Sec. IV by numerical modeling that an eaves-
dropper attack exists that enables Eve to steal the secret
key. We discuss countermeasures in Sec. V and conclude
in Sec. VI.
II. QKD SYSTEM UNDER TEST
A free-space QKD receiver typically employs a tele-
scope to reduce the size of a collimated beam, followed
by a non-polarizing beamsplitter to randomly choose be-
tween two measurement bases. It is followed by polariza-
tion beamsplitters and single-photon detectors to mea-
sure photons in the four states of polarization: horizontal
(H), vertical (V), +45◦ (D), and −45◦ (A) [14–22]. The
receiver we test is a prototype for a quantum commu-
nication satellite [36], operating at 532 nm wavelength
[Fig. 1(a,c)]. Its telescope consists of a focusing lens
L1 (diameter 50 mm, focal length f = 250 mm; Thor-
labs AC508-250-A) and collimating lens L2 (f = 11 mm;
Thorlabs A397TM-A). The collimated beam of . 2 mm
diameter then passes through a 50:50 beamsplitter BS
(custom pentaprism [36]) and pairs of polarization beam-
splitters PBS1 and PBS2 (Thorlabs PBS121). PBS2 in-
creases the polarization extinction ratio in the reflected
arm of PBS1. Lenses L3 (Thorlabs PAF-X-18-PC-A) fo-
cus the four beams into 105 µm core diameter multimode
fibers (Thorlabs M43L01) leading to single-photon detec-
tors (Excelitas SPCM-AQRH-12-FC).
Long-distance free-space QKD receivers are multimode
for two reasons. First, propagation of Alice’s beam, ini-
tially single-mode, through a turbulent atmosphere splits
it into multiple spatial modes [37]. Second, the finite pre-
cision and speed of real-time angular tracking of Alice’s
beam requires that Bob accepts multiple spatial modes
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FIG. 1. (color online). Experimental setup. (a) Scheme of the experimental apparatus, top view (drawing not to scale). Eve’s
source consists of a fiber-coupled 532 nm laser, attenuator A, polarization controller PC, and a collimating lens mounted on a
two-axis motorised translation stage. The latter allows changing the beam’s incidence angle and lateral displacement at Bob’s
front lens L1 simultaneously. Green (light gray) marginal rays parallel to the optical axis denote the original alignment of
Alice’s beam to Bob. Red and blue (dark gray) marginal rays show a scanning beam from Eve tilted at an angle (φ, θ) relative
to the original beam. Features¶–¹ mark different transmission paths for light inside Bob. (b) Normalized detection efficiency
η in channel V versus the illumination angle (φ, θ). This scan was taken to show the features clearly by placing Eve at a closer
distance. (c) Photograph of Bob’s receiver. The actual distance between facing surfaces of L2–BS is 42 mm, BS–PBS1 66 mm,
PBS1–L3 31 mm, PBS1–PBS2 45 mm, PBS2–L3 10 mm in channel A and 5 mm in channel V.
in a certain acceptance angle [18, 19, 22, 38]. Use of
single-mode fibers under these conditions would lead to
additional coupling losses & 10 dB [39] if the system does
not include appropriate (and often expensive) adaptive
correction optics [37]. Therefore, multimode fibers and
detectors with larger area are generally preferred as they
allow good collection efficiency without increasing com-
plexity and cost.
III. EXPERIMENT
In order to exploit the mismatch in efficiency, Eve
needs to know the mismatch for the four detectors as
a function of the input angle. Hence, our first step
was to scan Bob’s receiver for possible efficiency mis-
match. Eve’s source [Fig. 1(a)] consists of a 532 nm
laser coupled into single-mode fiber, attenuator A, polar-
ization controller PC, and a collimating lens L4 (Thor-
labs C220TME-A) mounted on a two-axis motorised
translation stage (Thorlabs MAX343/M). In Fig. 1(a),
green (light gray) marginal rays denote the initial align-
ment from Eve, replicating the alignment from Alice to
Bob. This is the initial position of the translation stage
φ = θ = 0. As we moved the stage in the transverse
plane, it changed the beam’s incidence angle and lateral
displacement at Bob’s front lens L1 simultaneously. This
is shown by red (dark gray) marginal rays in Fig. 1(a),
representing a beam from Eve coming at an angle (φ, θ)
relative to the initial beam.
Before scanning, the optics in Bob’s apparatus was
aligned to maximize coupling into all four detectors at
the normal incidence, which is the standard alignment
procedure for QKD. Note that many free-space QKD
systems employ a real-time tracking system to maintain
this initial alignment [18, 19, 22, 38]. We then started
the scanning procedure that involved first, changing the
outgoing beam’s angle (φ, θ), and then recording the cor-
responding count rate at all four detectors of Bob. For
each data point, we used an integration time of 1 s. Our
scan consisted of approximately 100×100 data points in a
square matrix covering the whole clear aperture of Bob’s
front lens L1. Then during post-processing, for each data
point for each detector, we subtracted the corresponding
detector’s background count rate, and then normalized it
by dividing by the maximum count rate in that detector.
At first, we did a preliminary scan using optical power
meters (Thorlabs PM200 with S130C head) that re-
vealed several features, highlighted in Fig. 1(b). Around
φ = θ = 0, maximum light coupling resulted in the cen-
tral peak ¶. With increasing scanning angle, the fo-
cused beam started missing the fiber core, and the detec-
tor count dropped off ·. A region was found when the
beam reflected off a polished edge of PBS2 back into the
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FIG. 2. (color online). Angular efficiency scan of the receiver, and points of interest. Four pair of plots H, V, D, A shown in
both 3D and 2D represent normalized detection efficiency in the four receiver channels versus illuminating beam angle (φ, θ).
The angle φ = θ = 0 is the initial angle of QKD operation. The last plot shows angle ranges with a high mismatch, usable in
our attack.
fiber core, causing the peak¸. Increasing the angle fur-
ther made the beam hit the anodized aluminum mount of
L1 and possibly edges of other lens mounts and round el-
ements in the optical assembly. It was scattered at these
edges, producing two ring-like features¹. Beyond these
features, there were no noticeable power reading, as the
beam completely missed the receiver aperture.
We then adjusted the receiver setup to minimize the
peak ¸, and performed final scans at 26.1 m distance
using Bob’s single-photon detectors (Excelitas SPCM-
AQRH-12-FC). During these scans, the beam at L1 was
Gaussian-shaped with 9 mm width (at 1/e2 peak inten-
sity). The scans were done in 38.3 µrad steps covering
±1.84 mrad range, corresponding to lateral displacement
of ±48 mm at L1. Figure 2 shows the normalized detec-
tion efficiency in all four receiver channels as a function of
(φ, θ). Most of the original features are still visible. How-
ever, outside the narrow central range of angles close to
φ = θ = 0, individual channel’s efficiencies vary inde-
pendently. Also, the size and shape of the central peak
is significantly different between channels. This was im-
possible to identify during the normal alignment proce-
dure. This effect can be attributed to imprecise focus-
ing, optical path length difference between the arms, off-
centered alignment of lenses, mode-dependent bending
loss in fibers, and individual variations in components.
These may have also caused the efficiency at one side of
the outer ring being higher. Because of these reasons,
there exist angles such that if photons are sent at those
angles, one channel has a much higher click probability
than the rest.
IV. ATTACK MODEL
To emphasize the security threat, it is useful to model
an attack that exploits the discovered side-channel. One
possible attack is the faked-state attack [30, 40], which is
an intercept-and-resend attack in which Eve attempts to
deterministically control Bob’s basis choice and detection
outcome. We model a practical faked-state attack using
the obtained data and the following assumptions: Al-
ice and Bob perform non-decoy-state Bennett-Brassard
1984 (BB84) protocol using polarization encoding. Alice
emits weak coherent pulses with mean photon number µ
equal to Alice–Bob line transmittance [5]. Whenever Bob
registers a multiple click, he performs a squashing oper-
ation (double-click in one basis is mapped to a random
value in that basis, while multiple clicks in different bases
are discarded) [41–43]. Alice and Bob also monitor to-
tal sifted key rate, and quantum bit error ratio (QBER).
Eve has information about Bob’s receiver characteristics
described above, and only uses devices available in to-
day’s technology. She intercepts photons at the output
of Alice, using an active basis choice and superconduct-
ing nanowire detectors, with overall detection efficiency
ηe = 0.85 and dark count probability < 10
−9 per bit slot
[44]. Then, a part of her, situated close to Bob, regener-
ates the measured signal and sends to Bob. We assume
that Alice–Bob and Alice–Eve fidelity F = 0.9831 [36],
while Eve–Bob experimentally measured F = 0.9904.
Here fidelity refers to the probability that a polarized
photon will emerge from the PBS at the correct path,
which is related to visibility by F = (1 + visibility)/2.
We also confirmed experimentally that Eve–Bob fidelity
is preserved at all illumination angles shown in Fig. 2.
From Eve’s point of view, she wants to maximize the
detection probability when Bob measures in compati-
ble (i.e., same as her) basis, to maximize Eve–Bob mu-
tual information. Also, she wants to minimize Bob’s
detection probability in non-compatible basis, to min-
imize QBER. Let ηi(j) be the efficiency of Bob’s i-th
channel (i ∈ {h, v, d, a}) given that incoming light is
j ∈ {H,V,D,A} polarized. Thus to find attack points for
the j-th polarization, we choose angles that have higher
4values of ηj(j) and δj(j) = min
{
ηj(j)
ηnc0(j)
,
ηj(j)
ηnc1(j)
}
, where
ηnc0 and ηnc1 are the normalized efficiencies of the two
detectors in the non-compatible basis. Our experimental
attack angles are shown in the rightmost plot in Fig. 2.
For example, the H attack angles were composed of points
for which ηh(H) ≥ 0.2 and δh(H) ≥ 75. Similarly, for
the V, D and A attack angles, ηv(V ) ≥ 0.002, δV ≥ 8;
ηd(D) ≥ 0.4, δD ≥ 80; ηa(A) ≥ 0.1, δA ≥ 20. The
thresholds used here to find the attack angles were not
optimal, and were picked manually.
To derive the key rate and QBER formula in Eve’s
presence, we start with a system with only Eve and Bob.
Let’s consider Eve sending an H-polarized pulse to Bob
within the attack angles H. Before squashing, the raw
click probability pi(j) that detector i in Bob clicks given
Eve has sent j-polarized light is
ph(H) ≈ ch + 1− exp
(
−µHFηh(H)
2
)
,
pv(H) ≈ cv + 1− exp
(
−µH(1− F )ηv(H)
2
)
,
pd(a)(H) ≈ cd(a) + 1− exp
(
−µHηd(a)(H)
4
)
,
(1)
where µH is Eve’s mean photon number and ci is Bob’s
background click probability per bit slot in i-th channel.
The probability Phv(H) that after squashing Bob mea-
sures in HV basis, given Eve has sent an H-polarized
pulse, is composed of three events: when only detector H
clicks, when only detector V clicks, or when both click.
It can be written as
Phv(H) =
[
1− pd(H)
][
1− pa(H)
]
× [ph(H) + pv(H)− ph(H)pv(H)]. (2)
Let’s now include Alice into the picture. Consider Al-
ice sends an H-polarized pulse, and Eve intercepts it. Let
P ec ≈ 12 (1 − e−µFηe)e−µ(1−F )ηe and P ew ≈ 12e−µFηe(1 −
e−µ(1−F )ηe) be the probability that Eve measures in the
compatible basis (i.e., the same basis as Alice) and gets a
click only in the correct and wrong detector respectively.
Let P enc ≈ 12 (1 − e−
µηe
2 )e−
µηe
2 be the probability that
she measures in the non-compatible basis (different basis
than Alice’s) and gets a click in a single detector. The
sifted key rate given Alice has sent H-polarized light is
Re(H) ≈P ec Phv(H) + P ewPhv(V ) + P enc [Phv(D)+Phv(A)]
+ (1− P ec − P ew − 2P enc)(ch + cv − chcv).
(3)
An error can occur when Eve measures Alice’s signal in
non-compatible basis or when Eve measures in compati-
ble basis but Bob measures a wrong value owing to im-
perfect fidelity or dark count. Hence, the error rate con-
ditioned on Alice sending H-polarized light is
EH ≈P ec Pv(H) + P ewPv(V ) + P enc [Pv(D) + Pv(A)]
+ (1− P ec − P ew − 2P enc)(cv −
cvch
2
),
(4)
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FIG. 3. (color online). Modeled QBER observed by Bob ver-
sus line loss. The dotted curve shows QBER without Eve. At
lower line loss, the QBER is due to imperfect fidelity, while at
higher line loss Bob’s detector background counts become the
dominant contribution. The lower solid curve (blue) shows
QBERe under our attack when only the total Bob’s sifted key
rate Rab is matched. The upper solid curve (red) additionally
keeps his four channel rates equal.
where Pi(j) is the probability that Bob measures value i
after squashing, given Eve has sent j-polarized light. For
example,
Pv(H) =
[
pv(H)− ph(H)pv(H)
2
][
1−pd(H)
][
1−pa(H)
]
.
(5)
Sifted key rates and errors in Eve’s presence [Eqs. (3)
and (4)] conditioned on V , D, A polarizations sent by
Alice can be calculated similarly. The total sifted key
rate and QBER in Eve’s presence become
Re =
1
4
∑
j=H,V,D,A
Re(j),
QBERe =
1
4Re
∑
j=H,V,D,A
Ej .
(6)
The only free parameters left for Eve to manipulate
are the mean photon numbers of her signal. Knowing
the angular scanning data, Eve can use a numerical opti-
mization to find values of µH , µV , µD, µA that minimize
QBERe while keeping Re = Rab, where Rab is Bob’s
sifted key rate without Eve. Our numerical optimiza-
tion achieves this for Alice–Bob channel loss ≥ 3 dB
if they are willing to accept a slight increase of QBER
by less than 0.7% (see Fig. 3). Here we assumed Bob’s
detector parameters as measured by us: efficiency at
φ = θ = 0 was 0.4 in all four channels, and individual de-
tector background count probabilities were in the range
of 430×10−9 to 1560×10−9 per 1 ns coincidence window.
These optimization results are realistic conditions for a
successful attack on most communication channels [14–
17, 19, 20, 22, 36] Note that the distance Eve–Bob can
be increased without affecting attack performance, by re-
placing Eve’s illuminator with four collimators oriented
at the required attack angles.
We went further and imposed an additional constraint
on Eve to make Re(H) = Re(V ) = Re(D) = Re(A) =
Rab. Our optimization shows that it is still possible
for Eve to pick appropriate mean photon numbers and
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FIG. 4. (color online). Angular efficiency scan of the receiver after a 25 µm diameter pinhole (Thorlabs P25S) is placed
in the focal plane of L1, L2 [Fig. 1(a)]. No detectable mismatch between channels was found under tight search conditions
ηi(j) ≥ 0.001 and δi(j) ≥ 4.
successfully attack the system with resultant QBER <
6.82% in 3–15 dB line loss range (Fig. 3). Similar QBER
values are typical for outdoor channels, because of back-
ground light. Eve could shield Bob from the latter to
hide QBER resulting from her attack.
We would like to point out that the attack angles de-
pend on the way the setup is constructed, the imperfec-
tions of each individual sample of component, and each
individual alignment procedure. I.e., no two setups are
identical, even if they are produced in the same assem-
bly line, and they will generally have different attack
angles. However, from a theoretical point of view, in
quantum cryptography it is assumed from Kerckhoffs’
principle [45] that except for the keys themselves, Eve
has knowledge about all other parameters in the system.
It is thus a valid assumption that she knows the attack
angles. From a practical point of view, Eve may try tech-
niques proposed in [40]. She may replace a small fraction
of the signal states with faked states at different spatial
angles, then listen to the classical communication to get
an estimate of the efficiency of Bob’s detectors at those
angles. In this way she may gradually improve her esti-
mate on the mismatch without causing excessive QBER.
When she has enough information on the statistics of the
mismatch, she can launch her full-fledged attack.
V. COUNTERMEASURES
In our attack, by sending lights at different angles, Eve
has broken a fundamental assumption of security proofs
that detection probabilities are independent of detection
basis [46, 47]. We propose to restore this assumption
by placing a spatial filter (pinhole) at the focal plane of
Bob’s L1 and L2 [Fig. 1(a)]. Spatial filtering is some-
times done before the beamsplitters to increase signal-
to-background ratio in the channel [17, 18, 21], how-
ever it has not been characterised as a security coun-
termeasure. We performed scanning with 100, 75, and
25 µm diameter pinholes, and found that decreasing the
pinhole diameter gradually reduces the mismatch. The
25 µm diameter pinhole eliminated any visible mismatch
(Fig. 4) even though we reduced our search parameters
to ηi(j) ≥ 0.001 and δi ≥ 4. This pinhole provides Bob’s
field-of-view of 100 µrad, which does not reduce his effi-
ciency with turbulent atmospheric channels [19]. Hence,
we conclude that a 25 µm pinhole may be an efficient
countermeasure for the current setup.
Note that, in Refs. 29 and 48, a detector scrambling
strategy was proposed that might be an effective coun-
termeasure against efficiency mismatch attacks for single-
photon qubits. However, it is not clear how effective that
countermeasure is, when one considers that the detectors
operate on optical modes, not on single-photon signals.
This can be a future study.
VI. CONCLUSION
Our analysis implies that data obtained during a QKD
session can be explained by an intercept-resend attack ex-
ploiting the spatial mode side-channels. Therefore, there
is no postprocessing or privacy amplification that can
eliminate Eve’s knowledge without sacrificing all key [49].
Although our practical attack should work, and the phys-
ical countermeasure seems promising, there is still room
for improvement on both the attack scheme and counter-
measures. Eve can employ more attack angles or combine
this attack with some other suitable attack schemes, to
increase the number of her free parameters. Alice and
Bob can make this harder by monitoring more parame-
ters. We expect that our attack can be conducted also in
the related decoy-state protocol [50], though the require-
ment to match the correct decoy statistics will modify
the parameter regime where it will be effective. Another
possible future study is to fully implement the present
attack under realistic outdoor channel conditions.
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